C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000493
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/PPD, NEA/MAG, NEA/PI, AND DRL/NESCA
LONDON FOR MOC
DUBAI FOR PELLETIER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO SCUL OIIP KIRC MO
SUBJECT: AL-JAZEERA BUREAU CHIEF EXPECTS RABAT OFFICE TO
CLOSE PERMANENTLY
REF: RABAT 0416
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Al-Jazeera's Rabat bureau chief dismissed
Government of Morocco (GOM) claims that the suspension of
Al-Jazeera's broadcast license was technical. Given that no
one in the GOM would claim responsibility for the decision,
he believed it came directly from the King. He criticized
Moroccans for having "no clue" how news agencies make
editorial and reporting decisions, and for thus having
unreasonable and petty expectations about Al-Jazeera's
coverage of local events. He held out little hope that the
problem would be resolved, and reported that Doha would
likely move the North Africa bureau to Madrid or Paris. End
summary.
¶2. (C) Information Officer David Ranz and Information
Specialist Salwa Jaafari met on May 21 with Rabat Bureau
Chief Hassan Rachidi in Al-Jazeera's eerily dark and empty
Rabat office, to discuss the GOM decision to suspend
Al-Jazeera's broadcast license (reftel). When asked about
prospects for re-opening the bureau, Rachidi stated "two days
ago, I was hoping the Moroccans would change their mind, but
now I don't have any hope."
¶3. (C) Following weeks of pleading for a meeting, Rachidi
had finally been received on May 20 by Communications
Minister Khaled Naciri, who stated flatly that he had nothing
to add to the notification letter provided by the National
Agency for Telecommunications Regulation (ANRT) suspending
the license. Rachidi had been unable to get an appointment
with anyone at the Higher Audiovisual Communications
Authority (HACA), the agency ostensibly responsible for
providing broadcast licenses. Sources in HACA had told him
informally that they had been handed the portfolio suspending
Al-Jazeera's license without prior consultation and were in
no position to overturn the decision.
¶4. (C) Rachidi dismissed the official GOM line that the
suspension was technical. Indeed, according to Rachidi, the
ball had long been in HACA's court. Al-Jazeera had
incorporated locally, as required by the Moroccan broadcast
law. Al-Jazeera had submitted a license request in 2006, and
had repeatedly followed up with HACA in writing asking to
formalize its presence in Morocco. HACA was responsible for
proposing a draft "cahier des charges" (terms of reference)
for Al-Jazeera's consideration, but had repeatedly declined
to do so. Every attempt on Rachidi's part to approach HACA
had been rebuffed, he stated. Thus the fact that Al-Jazeera
had been operating on a series of temporary three-month
licenses was as a result of HACA's inaction, not
Al-Jazeera's, Rachidi asserted.
¶5. (C) Rachidi stated that Al-Jazeera's opponents in the GOM
had been carefully developing a file documenting reporting
perceived to reflect anti-Moroccan bias ever since the bureau
began broadcasting in 2006. He acknowledged that the slight
against Fouad Ali El-Himma's followers cited reftel might
have been the precipitating factor in the decision, but he
believed Moroccan concerns about Al-Jazeera ran much deeper.
He cited, for example, criticism he had received that
Al-Jazeera had insufficiently trumpeted USG support for UNSYG
Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum's recent statements that
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autonomy was not a realistic option for Western Sahara.
Moroccan critics would not accept his explanation that this
was a UN and USG matter, which could only be covered by
Al-Jazeera's U.S. bureaus, over which he exerted no control.
He had also received complaints that Al-Jazeera had not
covered the recent visit of the King to the village of
Afengou to launch a series of socioeconomic projects, while
Al-Jazeera had been the first television station to report
that a number of the town's residents had frozen to death
during the winter of 2006-7.
¶6. (C) Rachidi concluded that the ultimate decision to close
Al-Jazeera's bureau had come from the King himself. He based
this on the fact that no other individual or agency in the
GOM would take responsibility for the decision, or even
discuss it with him. For example, he related that a
parliamentarian had been scheduled to pose a question about
the closure, but the question had been withdrawn at the last
moment. Prime Minister Abbas El-Fassi had not known about
the decision until after it had been formally announced, he
claimed. He found this surprising, as El-Himma had made no
effort to hide his disdain for Al-Jazeera due largely to its
coverage during the 2007 elections of a major scandal in
El-Himma's past.
¶7. (C) Rachidi confirmed press reports that Al-Jazeera was
considering moving its North African headquarters to Paris or
Madrid. Unless the GOM changed its stance, which he judged
very unlikely, Al-Jazeera headquarters in Doha would likely
make the decision to move within a few weeks.
¶8. (C) As for himself, Rachidi stated he would leave Rabat
shortly and return to Doha, where his family lives,
regardless the outcome. A Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent,
Rachidi had expected "when I accepted the job with Al-Jazeera
to come back to my country as a hero." Instead, he said
ruefully, he had lost many of his friends. Moroccans did not
appreciate that most editorial decisions came from Doha; they
treated Rachidi as a traitor for covering Morocco in a
negative light. By way of example, he cited an instance in
which Doha had ordered him to produce a story about a
Moroccan whose permanent residence was a public toilet (it
even said so on his ID card), a story his friends lambasted
him for covering.
¶9. (C) Comment: The GOM decision, whoever made it, would
seem to be spectacularly short-sighted. Whatever the
criticism of Al-Jazeera's coverage ) and some of the
examples cited by Rachidi seem awfully petty ) Al-Jazeera
was very careful to temper its coverage of Moroccan affairs
for fear of running afoul of local authorities. Al-Jazeera
will feel no such restraint now, and indeed may sharpen its
criticism of Morocco in retaliation for the office closing.
Such was certainly the case in the immediate aftermath of the
decision, when Al-Jazeera ran nightly reports for several
days, including many man-on-the-street interviews (including
from Morocco) critical of the GOM.
¶10. (C) We note as well that Al-Jazeera is not the only
foreign news organization facing such problems; several
Spanish journalists (the largest contingent of foreign
journalists in Morocco) have recently been grappling with
their own conflicts with the GOM. We are following up on
reports that a Spanish television channel is considering
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leaving Morocco over licensing problems similar to those
faced by Al-Jazeera, and senior Spanish journalists told us
that a recent dispute over the accreditation of two Spanish
print journalists in Morocco was resolved only after the
Spanish Government was pressured by a local Spanish
journalism association to intervene with the GOM. End
comment.
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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
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Riley